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Dan J. Stein’s editorial on philosophy and psychiatry
notes his recent publication titled Problems of Living.1
This a Big Book. I do not particularly mean in terms of
length, for the book runs to about 300 pages. I have three
other things in mind.
One is that Stein’s book addresses some of the most
important and difficult questions about the nature of
human life and how to live it, among which are: What
can we know about human nature and our environment?
What is a mind? What is suffering? What is the difference
between right and wrong? What makes a life meaningful?
A second is that the book answers these kinds of
questions from a bird’s eye view, in the first instance
considering theoretical answers to them and in the fields
of both philosophy and psychiatry (while also addressing
some specific, concrete matters). As Stein plausibly
suggests in his editorial, combining insights from these
two fields is likely not only to enrich our scholarly under-
standing of psychiatry, but also to help psychiatrists and
their patients grapple with practical quandaries.
A third is that in discussing theories of the human
condition, the book invokes an amazingly wide array of
literature, to the point of citing nearly 2,000 works. (Many
are in footnotes, which one need not read to grasp the
major points.)
To obtain focus, in the rest of this critical notice I
explore Stein’s discussion of life’s meaning, particularly
as it pertains to philosophy, one of this reader’s areas of
expertise. Stein describes his approach to meaning in life
as ‘‘integrative,’’ like his approach to all the other major
questions he addresses. An integrative position is one
that is in between two extremes, taking kernels of truth
from each and combining them in a plausible way.
In the context of life’s meaning, one integrative app-
roach is to advance a hybrid account of what confers
meaning on life, in contrast to a subjective or objective
account. A subjective view is that meaning consists of
whatever an individual is attracted to,2 whereas an objec-
tive view is that there is a proper way to live, regardless
of the individual’s subjective orientation.3 A hybrid view is
that meaningfulness consists of living in the objectively
proper way, while also being subjectively attracted to
doing so.4
For another example of an integrative approach to life’s
meaning, Stein advances pluralism in contrast to both
monism and relativism. A monist view is that there is a
single kind of life that is meaningful (or at least most
meaningful, on which consider Aristotle’s prizing of philo-
sophy5), whereas relativism is the view that any kind of
life is meaningful, so long as it is believed to be. A pluralist
view is that there are many kinds of life that are mean-
ingful and that cannot be reduced to a single property.6
Here is a third illustration of integration. On the one
hand, there is the view that we can in principle quantify
how much meaning would come from a given action
compared to others, say, by adding up the final value of
their consequences.7 On the other hand, there is the view
that it is, if not nonsensical, then at least pointless to think
of measuring how much meaning there is in an action
(let alone a life), perhaps because meaning is ineffable or
incommensurable.8 In between, there is the moderate
position that, although we cannot specify with cardinal
numbers how meaningful an action is, we can know that
some actions are more meaningful than others, such that
we can make progress.9
These examples should give the reader a good idea
of Stein’s broader project, which this reader finds quite
sensible. For all the major topics, he routinely contrasts a
more hard-nosed, narrow, scientistic, or objectivist app-
roach (often called ‘‘classical’’) with a softer, lax, interpre-
tive, or subjective approach (‘‘critical’’), where his own
view is in between. Often ‘‘realism’’ is an apt description of
Stein’s middle ground. That involves presuming there are
objective facts of the matter about meaning and other
enquiries, but that there are a variety of ways of app-
rehending those facts that socially contingent beliefs and
practices sometimes facilitate and sometimes frustrate.
For philosophers already sympathetic to an integrative
or realist approach, there are details that get glossed over
in Problems of Living, but that are naturally of interest. For
a first example, suppose one accepts the hybrid approach
to what makes a life meaningful. Is being attracted to what
one is doing a necessary condition for it to be meaningful,
or is it merely a contributory condition? For instance, if a
nurse is not drawn to cleaning out patients’ bedpans, but
does it anyway, does no meaning accrue at all to her life
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or would there merely be more meaning if she were so
drawn?10
For a second example, accepting pluralism, the view
that there are many sources of meaning in life, can the
different sources be grouped in plausible ways? Granted
that they cannot be reduced to one basic feature, can they
be largely reduced to, say, four major ones?11
For a third example, suppose Stein is correct that we
can know how to enhance the amount of meaning in our
lives, but cannot assign cardinal numbers in the way a
consequentialist would seek to do in the manner of cost-
benefit analysis. Is only an ordinal ranking of mean-
ingfulness available, or is something richer on offer? An
ordinal ranking would tell us that it is more meaningful to
liberate a country from oppression using non-violent
means than it is to feed 1,000 people who would have
otherwise suffered from malnutrition, which, in turn, is
more meaningful than guiding an old lady across the
street. However, it would not tell us anything about
whether the extent to which the liberation is more
meaningful than the feeding is greater than the extent to
which the feeding is more meaningful than the guiding. Is
there more to say on that score?
For many of us who have been party to the philo-
sophical debates, the action these days is in addressing
how to specify the integrative positions, not so much in
defending integration as such relative to the poles
between which it lies. However, even philosophers would
gain from reading Problems of Living. For one, Stein
tends to draw on established integrative approaches in
philosophy to articulate and defend more novel ones in
psychiatry, which should be of interest to philosophers
of mind, neuroscience, psychology, and related fields.
For another, Stein provides big pictures of several
controversies that have ranged over many decades and
does so all together. It is interesting and illuminating to
see the classical/critical/integrative positions comprehen-
sively applied to an array of debates about the nature of
mind, knowledge, happiness, morality, meaning, and still
others. Stein’s Big Book is therefore also revealing as an
intellectual history of theorization about the human
condition. No small feat.
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